Claire SadarIn the wake of the October 10 double bombing in Ankara, apocalyptic predictions about Turkey’s future have rapidly multiplied. While some of these pessimistic predictions may not be entirely incorrect, they highlight longstanding problems with analysis on Turkish politics: extreme swings in predictions about Turkey’s future and an oversimplification of the complex dynamics dominating the country.
According to many pundits, Turkey is either the first 21st-century democratic Muslim power or “coming apart at the seams.” But past claims that Turkey is a model for Arab Spring countries and current predictions about Turkey’s eminent descent into Pakistani or Syrian levels of anarchy are gross exaggerations.
For a variety of reasons, Turkish democracy is real, but far from ideal. It is also unlikely current violence in the country will break Turkey apart or destroy the power of the central government.
Turkish Democracy and Long Term Stability Is Here to Stay
As I have written previously, Turkey has suffered and continues to suffer from a lack of democratic and liberal political institutions. Even during the height of the “liberal” period (roughly 2002-2011), over which the AKP party presided, few concrete steps were taken to liberalize Turkish institutions.
The only exception was the reigning in of Turkey’s previously powerful military leadership, through what turned out to be false accusations that they were plotting a coup. Ultimately, however, railroading the military leadership arguably did more harm than good for Turkey’s democratic prospects. In the long run, it gave the AKP the impression it was above and could manipulate the law. The consequences of this could be seen in the series of unfair trials of military personnel and journalists involved in a so-called “coup” against the AKP government, as well as the party’s willful flouting of unfavorable judicial rulings.
Despite all this, Turkey’s democratic tradition runs deep and has proven to be remarkably resilient, recovering from multiple coups and extended periods of violence. That resilience continues to this day.
Turkey is also hardly on the brink of breaking apart. While violence in the country has primarily targeted the Kurdish community, Turkish Kurds continue to demonstrate great forbearance and commitment to a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Turkish flags were flown as a sign of solidarity at the funerals for the victims of the Ankara bombings, most of whom were Kurds. Inter-ethnic violence is, of course, a real danger in Turkey. But, as long as the Kurdish HDP party acts as a political outlet for grievances, a full blown return to the Turkish-PKK conflict, which began over thirty years ago but had taken a turn toward resolution until recently, can be averted.
Turkey’s Future and the November 1st Elections
While the Turkish state will not fall apart any time soon, increasing violence and political discontent among many sectors of Turkish society remain concerning. The government, which is still under AKP control, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are primarily responsible for these circumstances.
While the PKK is not blameless when it comes to renewed violence in Turkey’s southeast, it is the Turkish government that largely controls the level and timing of that violence. A recent political cartoon mocking Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sums up how the Turkish government has always manipulated the Turkish-PKK conflict. As the cartoon highlighted, the Turkish government has historically rekindled its fight against Kurdish nationalism as a distraction during times of political crisis. The Turkish government will continue to ignore calls from the PKK for a ceasefire until it is politically convenient for it to end the conflict.
That is unlikely to happen any time soon. After the June 7 elections, the AKP lost its bid to form a single party government. Having rebuffed attempts by other parties to form a coalition government, the AKP has forced Turkey to operate under a temporary government for the past several months. While Turks will go to the polls again on November 1, the election results are unlikely to differ significantly from June.
On the one hand, this would be a positive development since it would force the AKP to reopen negotiations to form coalition government. If these are successful, they would prevent the AKP from ruling unilaterally, which would be good for Turkish democracy. On the other hand, the AKP would be just as likely to reject a coalition government now as they were in June. This will leave Turkey in a state of limbo.
If the outcome in November is similar to June, Erdogan and the AKP will have some very important decisions to make. Analyst Michael Koplow argues that, under such a scenario, Erdogan would again kill all possibility of a coalition government. I agree that Erdogan is unlikely to accept a (second) defeat for the AKP. However, Turkey cannot simply continue indefinitely holding elections every five to six months. Something has to give. And this is why the AKP, independent of Erdogan, has a decision to make.
Though Erdogan dominates the party, there are important players in the AKP who have been demonstrably unhappy with being subordinate to the president. These leaders must decide whether it is in the party’s interest to follow Erdogan on his quest for unchecked presidential power, or whether it is time to begin playing politics and govern the country.
Ultimately, however, the decision by the AKP leadership will likely be based on what is good for its members, rather than what is best for the country. The party’s leaders may very well decide that continuing to allow Erdogan to manipulate the party for his own ends will not benefit them in the long run.
Though coalition governments have a reputation for weakness and political instability, particularly in Turkey, a coalition government is what Turkey needs right now. The country is deeply polarized, dealing with an ongoing refugee crisis and threatened by violence coming from inside and outside its borders. Turkey needs a diversity of political voices, dialogue, and compromise — not unilateral leadership.
